EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS DURING THE
AL-AQSA INTIFADA: A GRAVE BREACH OF THE 4th GENEVA CONVENTION
(Prepared by the Palestinian Society
for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment)
February 6, 2001
Introduction
Following the
executions[1]
of two Palestinians found guilty of collaborating with Israel on 13 January
2001, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak commented: “I am opposed to the
death penalties, which we saw [being carried out] in the Palestinian
Authority”[2].
In an allusion to the fact that the death sentences had been handed down by the
Palestinian State Security Court after grossly unfair trials[3],
the Israeli Prime Minister criticized the way the defendants had been executed
after “show trials reminiscent of
darker periods in history”[4].
While condemning the implementation of death sentences after unfair
trials in the PNA controlled areas, the Israeli government has repeatedly
approved the “liquidation” of Palestinians suspected of hostile activities
against Israeli soldiers or civilians. In the Israeli official rhetoric these
killings have been termed as “hitting Palestinian targets”, “pinpointing
attackers” or “neutralizing the organizers of attacks”.
However, in reality, these killings constitute extra-judicial executions,
where the victims have been killed without trial and without the chance of a
fair legal process designed to examine the allegations brought forward against
them. Instead they have been sentenced to death in a secret process, with no
opportunity to defend themselves or to appeal the sentence.
Apparently in response
to criticism of massive helicopter attacks on Palestinian targets, the Israeli
political and military establishment decided to adopt a policy of extra-judicial
executions to punish and deter with the aim of suppressing the current Intifada.
Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh explained the policy as follows:
“I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone has committed or
is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be hit…It is effective,
precise and just.”[5]
It should however be noted that Israel’s liquidation policy with regard to
Palestinian suspects is not new. Undercover units of the Israeli army also
carried out extra-judicial executions during the first Intifada (1987-1993) and
throughout the period of the Oslo Process.
Since 9 November 2000,
at least 8 Palestinians affiliated to Fatah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad and 6
bystanders have been killed pursuant to this policy while others have been
injured. The weaponry used to carry out the assassinations included sniper fire,
missiles from helicopter gunships, tank-fire and a bomb planted in a car. The
killings were carried out under circumstances, which suggest complete disregard
for the risk involved to the lives of bystanders. Some of the victims were
gunned down in the center of towns or even when driving a taxi with passengers.
Among those killed,
three were political prisoners who had been released from PNA prisons shortly
before their assassination. As hundreds of others associated to or suspected of
supporting the Islamist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Ibrahim Bani Audi, Anwar
Humran and Abbas Awiwi had been held in PNA prisons without charge or trial,
outside the framework of domestic law and in contravention of international
human rights standards. LAW had repeatedly demanded that they be either released
or promptly tried before a court operating in accordance with international fair
trial standards.
Statements by military
and political officials suggest that the Israeli government feels entitled to
“use all available means” and “do
everything possible in order to foil terrorist attacks.”[6]
It is within this conceptual framework that the assassination of Palestinians
perceived as a threat is legitimized on the grounds of its “effectiveness”.
However, whatever policy the Israeli government chooses to implement, it
must be within the limits imposed by international humanitarian and human rights
law. For this reason, Israel is not allowed to “use all available means” in
its confrontation with the Palestinians. No matter how “effective” they may
be, the undisputable fact is that extra-judicial executions are a violation of
international law. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel as the Occupying
Power has the right to arrest and bring to trial those suspected of violent
hostile activities. However, under the same Convention, extra-judicial
executions are wilful killings, which constitute war crimes and are subject to
universal jurisdiction.
Statements by Israeli officials: The Intent to
kill
The decision to
systematically implement a policy of political assassinations during the Al Aqsa
Intifada was taken after the use of helicopter attacks on PNA targets – police
stations, political party offices and TV stations – was deemed ineffective and
harmful to Israel’s image in the international community. In the wake of the
bomb attack on a bus in Hadera on 22 November 2000, senior military officials
announced that Israel would respond with a number of steps, which could include
“the use of special units to neutralize the organizers of the attack”.[7]
The same day Israel Radio reported that “Israel Air Force attacks against
Palestinian targets will be cut down to a minimum because they are not very
effective and cause harm to Israel’s image; instead, Israel will use elite
units to pinpoint attackers”.[8]
About ten days later, a senior Israeli defense official told the Israeli
newspaper Ha’aretz that the “new approach” would allow Israel “to take
advantage of places where there is a relative advantage in order to hit a
Palestinian target, even if this is not done immediately after an attack against
us.”[9]
In the same article, it was reported that pursuant to this policy, a number of
elite units of the Israeli army had been deployed in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip to target senior activists in Fatah and other Palestinian organizations.
On 2 January 2001, two
days after the assassination of Dr. Thabet in Tulkarem, the “liquidation
policy” was discussed in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.
During the committee meeting, a senior official in the security establishment
stated that “the activity
involving the assassination of wanted [terror] suspects is effective”.
When some members of the Knesset questioned the legal and moral basis of
these killings, Ehud Barak explained that Israel was in a warlike situation and
had to fight “terror” with all available means[10].
The Israeli Prime Minister added: “We
are at war…If people shoot at us and kill us, then our alternative is to
attack them. A state facing the threat of terror has to wage a struggle.”[11]
In the same meeting, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz referred to a legal
opinion issued by Military Advocate General Menachem Finkelstein arguing that in
exceptional cases it was permissible to kill ‘Palestinian terrorists’:
“This is not routine, but an exceptional method whose goal is to save human
lives in absence of any other alternative. (…) It is used against people [who
have] definitely [been] identified as having worked, and are working, to commit
attacks against Israel.”[12]
On 9 January 2001, Dr.
Thabet’s widow filed a petition with the Israeli High Court and asked the
Court to order the government to stop its liquidation policy. The High Court
subsequently asked Ehud Barak in his capacity as Israel’s Defense Minister, to
respond to the petition. Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein has stated that
there is no Israeli “shoot-to-kill” policy and that the government will soon
present to the High Court its position on the matter.[13]
However, recent statements by Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh after two
Israelis were killed in Tulkarem appear to indicate that Israel has no intention
of stopping its policy of assassinating Palestinian activists:
“There is no magic
remedy in this war. There’s no one means that provides answers to everything.
But on the bottom line, when you weigh the cost versus the benefit in human
lives, pinpoint operations against arch-terrorists – this is the most
effective thing.”[14]
Extra-judicial
Executions: 8 Cases
The assassination of
Hussein ‘Abayat on 9 November 2000 was the first known extra-judicial
execution carried out by Israel since the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada. A
number of killings followed, which LAW believes did also constitute
extra-judicial executions. The list below does however not claim to be
comprehensive.
The following
Palestinian political activists have been victims of the Israeli liquidation
policy during the Al Aqsa Intifada:
Hussein ‘Abayat was killed on 9 November
2000 in Beit Sahour near Bethelem when helicopters of the Israeli Air Force
fired anti-tank missiles on his car. Two women standing nearby, Aziza Mahmoud
Danoun Jubran (58) and Rahma Rasheed Shaeen Hindi (54), were killed. At least 3
other people were badly injured, namely Nasmi and Jamila Sh’ibat and
Khaled Salahat.
Jamal Abed Al Razeq, a
30-year-old Fatah activist, was killed at the Morag Junction in the Gaza
Strip on 22 November 2000. Three other Palestinians were killed during the
incident, namely Awni Ismail (37), Sami Abu Laban (35) and Nael Alidawi (25),
all from Rafah.
Anwar Mahmoud Humran was killed by snipers
of the Israeli army on 11 December 2000 when leaving Al Quds Open University in
the al Dahye quarter in Nablus.
Dr. Thabet Thabet
was killed by gunfire in Tulkarem on 31 December 2000, when reversing his car
outside his home.
EYEWITNESS REPORTS
The case of Hussein
‘Abayat, assassinated in Beit Sahour on 9 November 2000
On 9 November 2000, at
11.30 a.m., Hussein ‘Abayat, a 37-year-old local Fatah activist, was killed in
Beit Sahour near Bethelem when helicopters of the Israeli Air Force fired
anti-tank missiles on his car. During the attack, two women standing nearby,
Aziza Mahmoud Danoun Jubran (58) and Rahma Rasheed Shaeen Hindi (54), were
killed. At least 3 other people were badly injured, namely Nasmi and Jamila Sh’ibat
and Khaled Salahat.
Imad Jamil Fares, a
resident of Beit Sahour who lives near the site where ‘Abayat was
assassinated, reported to LAW[15]:
I remember the day,
it happened on 9 November 2000. My house is about 10 meters from the site where
‘Abayat was killed and I was at home. I did not see how his car was fired
upon. At around 11.45 in the morning, I suddenly heard an explosion and went out
to see what had happened. Within seconds, I heard another explosion. The windows
of my house were broken and the shutters were damaged. When I looked out I saw a
grey Mitsubishi on fire and the burnt body of the driver. Two women were lying
on the ground near the car and appeared to be critically injured. Their faces
were black, completely burnt and still bleeding.
I knew the two
women because they were from the same village as me but I did not recognize
them. They had come to Beit Sahour to visit a neighbor whose house had been
shelled by the Israeli army the night before. One of them, Aziza Danoun Jubran,
is actually a relative; she was my uncle’s wife. She had been hit in her head
and all her clothes were burnt but she was still alive. The other woman, Rahma
Shahin, had also been hit in the head and was bleeding severely from the
abdomen. Other people were also injured during the attack. For example, Nasmi
and Jamila Sh’ibat, a couple who live nearby. Nasmi had injuries all over his
body and could not move; Jamila was wounded in her face and the abdomen.
The Israeli army
justified the assassination of Hussein ‘Abayat, who was married and had four
children, and thus overtly admitted responsibility. Head of the Central Command
Major General Yitzhak Eitan argued that Abayat had organized many gunfire
attacks on Gilo, a Jewish settlement illegally established on territory occupied
by Israel in 1967. In relation with the assassination of ‘Abayat, the Israeli
newspaper Ha’aretz quoted Eitan as follows: “The State of Israel cannot for
long stay indifferent to the repeated attacks on its soldiers and civilians. Any
other country would long ago have responded with great force. We will continue
to hurt anyone trying to hurt us. This is not our first or our last move.”[16]
According to the same source, Israeli military sources further claimed that
“the attack was carried out in a ‘highly professional way’, and that
civilian casualties could not have been prevented.”[17]
In the afternoon of 23
November 2000, 34-year-old Hamas militant Ibrahim Bani Audi was killed in Nablus
by a bomb planted in his car by the Israeli security services with the
collaboration of Alan Bani Audi, a relative of Ibrahim. When the bomb exploded
Ibrahim was driving in front of the Al Salam mosque, on Jamal Abed al Nasser
Street, in the center of Nablus. He died instantly. Following the explosion,
helicopters of the Israeli Air Force were seen hovering over the town.
Israeli army sources
suggested that Ibrahim Bani Audi had been killed while preparing a bomb[18]. However, during his
trial in front of the Palestinian State Security Court in Nablus[19],
Alan Bana Audi admitted that he had been recruited by the Israeli security
services in February 2000. He explained how he was blackmailed into
collaboration and reported that during a meeting on 21 November Israeli agents
took his car for a few hours and instructed him to give it to Ibrahim[20]:
In February 2000, I was
arrested by Israeli intelligence agents and taken to a place for interrogation.
The agents played a tape with a conversation I had had with a girl and gave me a
cup of coffee with tranquilizers. After that I was shown pictures of myself with
a woman I did not know. They blackmailed me and I agreed to collaborate with
them.
When the Intifada broke
out the Israeli security agents asked me to watch Ibrahim Bani Audi and to
provide them with information about him. I visited Ibrahim in Jneid prison
several times and told him that I was willing to carry out suicide bombings and
that I wanted to join Hamas military wing [Izzadin Kassam]. We had a good
relationship and I informed the Israelis about him.
On Tuesday night, 21 November, I had a meeting with Israeli agents. During the meeting I noticed that my car was taken to another place for about three hours. I received instructions to give Ibrahim my car on Wednesday or Thursday and to go afterwards to Kossyn near Nablus. During prison furloughs, Ibrahim used to drive a car.
On Thursday, 23 November,
at about 12.30, I received a phone call from Ibrahim. He told me that he was in
Sefhian Street in Nablus and I gave him my car.
Afterwards I went to Kossyn. There were three Israeli agents waiting for me. After a while I received a phone call from a relative who told me that Ibrahim had been killed by an explosion in his car. The Israeli agents explained that their aim was to hit Hamas and to cause tension between Hamas and the PNA. They said that they did not want me to go back to my village and that I should stay in Israel.
Ibrahim Bani Audi was
a 34-year-old Hamas militant from the West Bank town of Tammoun near Jenin,
married with four children. He was assassinated while on furlough from Jneid
prison near Nablus, where he had been detained without trial since August 1998.
The case of Anwar
Mahmoud Humran, assassinated in Nablus on 11 December 2000
On 11 December 2000,
at about 1.30 p.m., Anwar Mahmoud Humran, a 28-year-old Islamic Jihad activist
from the West Bank village of Arrabe near Jenin, was killed by snipers of the
Israeli army in Nablus. Eyewitnesses reported that he was shot at from an
Israeli army outpost on Mount Jerzin when leaving Al Quds Open University in the
al Dahye quarter in Nablus. Rafidiah hospital in Nablus, where Humran was
subsequently taken, reported that his body had been hit by 19 bullets.
According to press
reports, the Israeli army said that soldiers had returned fire after being shot
at by Humran and other Palestinians, suggesting that he had been killed in an
exchange of fire.[21]
Eyewitnesses stated however, that there was no previous shooting in the area at
the time of the incident and that Humran appeared to be looking for a taxi when
he was suddenly struck down by intensive gunfire. Mayada Jum’a, an 18-year-old
student, reported to LAW[22]:
On 11 December, at
around 1.30 p.m., while doing some studying in the balcony of my flat, I saw a
man standing in the street, at a distance of about 10 meters from my house. I
knew him because he had rented a shop in the same building where I live. He was
on his own and appeared to be waiting for a taxi; maybe he was on his way home
from college. The area was quiet and there were no clashes going on at that
time.
Suddenly I heard
two gunshots and saw that a bullet had hit the man in the leg. He fell on the
ground and started screaming. The shots to his body continued however and did
not cease for about 5 minutes. The shooting came from the Israeli army outpost
on Mount Jirzeem. I think that he must have been hit by 20 bullets or more.
There were some university students around but everybody was scared, and it took
some time until people dared to approach the man lying on the ground.
I weep every time I
remember the incident. It is the first time in my life that someone has been
killed in front of my eyes. I ask God to let me forget what I have seen.
The account given by
another resident, 45-year-old Nura Libada, also indicates that Anwar Humran was
deliberately gunned down rather than killed in a shoot out[23]:
On 11 December, at
about 1.30 p.m., while I was cleaning at home, I heard heavy gunshots. At the
first moment, I thought that the shooting was directed against my house but my
son called me and said ‘come mama see, a guy has been shot’. I opened the
door and saw a man lying on the ground, at a distance of about 10 meters from my
house. The shots continued for about 5 minutes. I screamed and wondered why they
were shooting at this man in particular. I wanted to rush towards him but I was
terrified. There were people around, students and other pedestrians but no one
could reach him because of the shooting. We called an ambulance but he was
already dead when it arrived. He died instantly. I reckon that about 20 bullets
hit him.
On
12 December 2000, at about 2.30 in the afternoon, 28-year-old Fatah activist
Yousif Abu Swaye was gunned down by IDF snipers just outside his father’s
house in Al Khader village near Bethelem. According to information gathered by
LAW, he was approaching the house when a barrage of shots was fired at him and
riddled his body. He died immediately. His father, Ahmad Abu Swaye, told LAW[25]:
On Tuesday, 12 December, I
was expecting my son and his wife for the Iftar – the breaking of the fast
during Ramadan. He had got married nine months ago and his wife was pregnant.
She arrived first; Yousif had stopped at the Suleyman Pools for prayer and would
arrive shortly. The Suleyman Pools are very close to my house in Al Khader. A
short while later, at about 2.30 p.m., I heard gunshots. When I went out to see
what was happening I heard 5 more gunshots and saw a man lying on the ground, at
a distance of about 10 meters from my house. At that stage I did not realize
that the young man was my son. I rushed to help him but when I reached him he
did not move. He was already dead. The neighbors came and we took him to Beit
Jala hospital. Twenty-one bullets hit him all over his body including the head,
the neck and the chest. I did not see any soldiers at the site but the shots I
heard came from the direction of a nearby Israeli army outpost.
Yousif
Aby Swaye had been fined and detained during the first Intifada (1987-1993) and
was apparently wanted by Israel. His father reported that already in 1995
Israeli soldiers searching for his son had threatened to kill him:
In 1995 Israeli soldiers broke into my house in the middle of the night and forced all the family and me to stand against the wall. An officer called Captain Sultan inquired about Yousif’s whereabouts and threatened: ‘I know that he is hiding in the PNA controlled areas; never mind, we will bring him dead to you’.
According
to press reports, the Israeli army had no immediate comment but the
assassination came just hours after statements that Israel “would track down
and kill those who harm Israelis.”[26]
On
13 December 2000, 26-year-old Hamas activist Abas al Awiwi was killed by snipers
of the Israeli army in Hebron. At the time of the attack he was standing in
front of the shoe factory where he used to work, at a distance of 250 meters
from an Israeli checkpoint located between areas H1[27]
and H2. According to medical reports, al Awiwi was shot at close range and hit
by three bullets, two in the abdomen and one in the chest.
Abderrahman
Ahmad Abderrahman Badr, an engineer who has his office in the same building as
the shoe factory of the al Awiwi family, reported to LAW[28]:
On
13 December 2000, I was in my office in El Adel Street in the center of Hebron,
which is about 400 meters away from the H2 zone of Hebron, under Israeli
control. The shoe factory of the al Awiwi family is on the ground floor of the
building while my office is on the second floor.
I remember that it was
exactly 12.20 p.m. when I heard a sound like that of a bomb or a sound bomb. I
got off my chair and looked out of the window down to the street. At a distance
of about 5 meters from the sidewalk I saw the young Abas al Awiwi lying on the
ground. A group of young people rushed towards him, stopped a taxi, asked the
passengers to get off and put him in the taxi. Afterwards I learnt that he had
been shot dead.
According
to press reports the Israeli army refused to admit or deny responsibility for
the assassination.[29]
Apparently Israel claimed that Abas al Awiwi was carrying a pistol but
information collected by LAW indicates that he was unarmed at the time of the
attack.
Since 1997 Abas al Awiwi had been held several times in detention without trial in the prison of the Al Muqata’a in Hebron, under the control of the PNA. He had been released from prison about 5 weeks before his assassination.
On
31 December 2000, at around 10 a.m., Dr. Thabet Thabet, a 50-year-old dentist,
married and with three children, was killed by gunfire outside his home in the
West Bank city of Tulkarem. He was taken to Tulkarem hospital but died from his
wounds at about 10.30 the same morning. Dr. Thabet was Fatah’s secretary
general in Tulkarem, director general of the Palestinian Health Ministry in
Nablus and a lecturer in Public Health at Al Quds Open University.
His wife, Dr. Siham Thabet, reported to LAW[30]:
My husband was killed when
he was reversing his car outside our home in Tulkarem. He was on his way to work
at the PNA Health Ministry in Nablus. Our home is in Area A[31]
but he was shot from Area C[32],
from a distance of about 250 meters. Over 20 bullets hit him; later it was found
that three different kinds of ammunition had been used. It is obvious that the
aim of the “operation” was to kill him.
I
myself heard machine gun fire when I was on my way to work at the dental clinic.
I would however never have imagined that what I heard was my husband being
gunned down.
Palestinian
eyewitnesses confirmed that a unit of Israeli soldiers, hiding in a truck,
opened fired on Dr. Thabet while he was reversing his car. They also stated that
a car with an Israeli license plate was seen in the area and took off when Dr.
Thabet was hit, and that a military helicopter was hovering above the site at
the time.
After
the incident, the Israeli army did not acknowledge responsibility and said that
Dr. Thabet had been killed in an exchange of fire or in the midst of cross fire.[33] However, during a meeting
of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on 2 January 2001, a senior
Israeli security official was reported as stating the following with regard to
the killing of Dr. Thabet:
“We
attack terrorists who set out to shoot at [civilians]; we identify the heads of
squads and district commanders, and attack them. This activity frightens and
quiets a village; and as a result, there are regions in which [operatives] are
afraid of undertaking activities.”[34]
While
the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) claim that Dr. Thabet was a
“terrorist” responsible for planning attacks against Israeli civilians[35],
leaders of the Israeli Peace Now movement expressed shock at the assassination.
“He’s somebody we knew quite well”, said Meretz Knesset Member Naomi
Chazan.[36]
Dr. Siham Thabet confirmed that her husband had frequently taken part in
activities designed to advance reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians:
My
husband was a man in search of peace with Israel. He was a member of the joint
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation at the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in
October 1991. For a number of years he was involved with Israeli peace groups
and institutions fostering Palestinian-Israeli dialogue and coexistence such as
Peace Now and Givat Hagiva. As a matter of fact, Israeli peace activists called
or sent condolences when they learnt about his assassination. Some even came to
Tulkarem with flowers to pay him last honors but were stopped at the checkpoint
because of the ban on Israelis entering area A.
Whatever
the truth behind the Israeli allegations against Dr. Thabet, they cannot justify
his assassination, which constitutes an extra judicial execution in blatant
violation of international law. If the Israeli authorities believed that Dr.
Thabet was responsible for attacks on Israeli civilians they should have acted
within the framework of domestic and international law. In this regard, Dr.
Siham Thabet stressed that her husband could have easily been arrested during
one of his regular visits to a mosque located in area C, under full Israeli
control:
If the Israeli authorities
were suspicious about my husband why did they not arrest him and bring him
before a court? It would have been easy to do so. My husband used to go every
Friday to Suffarini mosque for prayer, near Faroun village. The mosque is in
Area C, under Israeli responsibility for civil affairs and all (internal and
external) security. It would have been easy for the Israeli authorities to
arrest him there, for example.
On 9
January 2001, Dr. Siham Thabet filed a petition with the Israeli High Court of
Justice asking the court to order Ehud Barak to refrain from “executing people
without trial”.[37]
The petitioner argued that extra judicial executions are in violation of the 4th
Geneva Convention and therefore illegal. Dr.
Thabet’s wife also asked the High Court to issue an interim injunction banning
Barak from ordering any such killings until the end of proceedings. The Israeli
High Court has refused to issue such an interim injunction but has ordered Barak,
as Defense Minister, to respond to Dr. Thabet’s petition.
While waiting for the outcome of the petition Dr. Siham Thabet explained to LAW:
Israel claims to be a
democratic society where no one is above the law. So I have turned to the
Israeli High Court of Justice. I do not want revenge. All I want is justice for
my husband who was a brave and courageous man. I want that those responsible for
the killing of my husband be brought to trial and punished for what they have
done. I also have asked the High Court to order Barak to stop his “liquidation
policy”. I am not a politician but I believe that no one should be killed that
way. These assassinations are barbaric and should be stopped immediately. There
are laws and courts to solve disputes. This is the path I personally have
chosen.
The Israeli government have pursued a policy of directly “eliminating” Palestinian individuals who they deemed to have planned, coordinated or directly carried out armed attacks against its troops and settlers in occupied territory, as well as against civilian targets within its sovereign borders. As a pretext for this policy, the Israeli authorities have categorized the current Palestinian uprising as an armed conflict, under the rationale that such a categorization justifies wide ranging counter-insurgency methods permitted under the doctrine of military necessity than would otherwise be the case.[38]
However, Israel’s assassination policy is deeply problematic within the context of international humanitarian law, and as will be argued below, in fact constitutes wilful killing, which is a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
International
humanitarian law recognizes two categories of person, combatant and
non-combatant. Combatant generally refers to an individual who is part of the
armed forces of a state who is a party to a conflict. Non-combatant generally
refers to individuals who are civilians who are not part of an organized armed
group such as the army of a state and who find themselves in the midst of an
armed conflict. Non-combatant also refers to individuals who are residents of a
territory that has come under the occupation of hostile forces of which they are
not citizens. Under the rubric of international humanitarian law, non-combatants
enjoy a special status. They are regarded as protected persons. Article 4 (1) of
the Fourth Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War defines protected persons as: “….. those who, at a given moment and
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals.” Pursuant to Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank in 1967, the Palestinian population are for the purposes of public
international law, protected persons.
International
humanitarian law is permissive in the sense that it confers upon the occupying
power wide ranging powers to administer the occupied territory and ensure
adequate safeguards for the protection of its troops and military installations.
Protected persons are under an obligation to obey the administrative measures of
the occupying power and the occupying power is under a legal obligation to abide
by the Convention’s provisions. However, in circumstances as in the case of
the Palestinian territories where the occupation has been prolonged and where
the occupying power has pursued actions such as settlement construction and
extensive land confiscations in order to thwart the legitimate right to
self-determination of the Palestinian people, it could conceivably be argued
that the protected persons have a legitimate right to resist the actions of the
occupying power.[39]
Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territories goes way beyond the custodial
role assigned to a belligerent occupant in public international law due to its
colonizing efforts. A right to resist could also be asserted because the two
safe guard mechanisms within the Convention stated in article 1: “The
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances” has
not been adhered to by Israel or the other High Contracting Parties, placing an
onus on the protected persons themselves to resist the wholesale commission of
war crimes against them as well as a concerted policy aimed at denying them the
right to self-determination as stipulated in article 1 (2) of the United Nations
Charter. The Declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, adopted in 1960, could be said to have set the terms for the
self-determination debate by emphasizing the colonial context. The Declaration
stipulates:
All
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
Protected
persons who resist the occupying power should not be deemed to have lost the
most salient safeguards to which they are entitled to as civilians under a
regime of belligerent occupation, such as the arbitrary denial of the human
right to life.
However, according to article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:
“……Where
in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or
saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the
security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where
absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights
of communication under the present Convention.
In
each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case
of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights
and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the
earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as
the case may be.
This article is
extremely important. The occupying power is not given a license to kill those
who it suspects are a threat to its security. Nor should an occupying
power that violates the fundamentals of international humanitarian law be
granted the right to liquidate those who resist those very violations in an
extra-judicial manner.
Protected persons who
resist the occupying power do not become combatants, but no longer enjoy some of
the protective provisions of the Convention. The occupying power is entitled to
apprehend them for example, or even kill them in the event of an actual
firefight. Those individual protected persons who are killed during active
engagement with the occupying power can be said to have been “lawfully
killed” if they posed an immanent threat to the life of the occupying troops.
However, the occupying power is not permitted to actively seek out for
liquidation those individuals that it suspects are engaged in hostile
activities. It is instead, under a primary obligation to attempt to arrest and
detain.[40] This can be seen to be
the gist of article 5. Clearly this construal of article 5 would apply to those
individuals who resist the actions of an occupying power. In sum, the occupying
is obliged to arrest and detain those that:
A)
It suspects are conducting hostile activities against its
occupation.
B)
Those who resist the occupying power.
As illustrated above,
Israel could have arrested and detained a number of those individuals who were
killed under the remit of the assassination policy. This puts Israel’s
assassination policy wholly at odds with international humanitarian law.
As there was a clear
intent to kill those who were deemed to be a risk to the security of the
occupation rather than apprehend, Israel’s assassination policy constitutes
wilful killing. The test for wilful killing is intent and the culpability for
these killings rests with the upper echelons of Israel’s security
establishment and their political masters. Wilful killing is a particularly
grievous crime within the context of international humanitarian law and
constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention subject to
international criminal prosecution. Article 146 and 147 of the Convention
clearly sets down the grave breaches of the convention and the implications of
such breaches. According to article 146:
The
High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following
Article.
Each
High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each
High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave
breaches defined in the following Article.
In
all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper
trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by
Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Article
147 in part stipulates:
Grave
breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of
the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the
present Convention: wilful killing………………
The
relevant provisions of international humanitarian law that regulates the
custodial nature of belligerent occupation insists absolutely on the principles
of humanity and proportionality. When dealing with an occupied civilian
population the occupying power is under a clear legal obligation to employ the
doctrine of military necessity in a judicious fashion. Actions within the rubric
of military necessity must be strictly circumscribed by the margin of
appreciation conferred upon the occupying power. Israel has long gone beyond the
margin of appreciation principle within international humanitarian law.
Israel’s liquidation policy has been carried out without clear detailed
charges against the marked individuals being furnished to the public domain for
scrutiny. Moreover, such a policy lends itself to the possibility of serious
errors, and in one clear case, the killing of Hussein ‘Abayat, Israel failed
the test of proportionality and discrimination when two bystanders were also
killed.
If international humanitarian law is to protect anyone, it cannot merely consider any casual contribution to armed hostile activity as participation, but only the contribution implementing the final element in the chain i.e. the event of the actual application of military violence and even then, the occupying power is bound by the principles of proportionality, discrimination and necessity. The principle of proportionality implies that the force used should not exceed the level required to stop the threat and must be in proportion to the harm threatened. The principle of discrimination implies that every effort must be made to avoid harm, and to minimize harm that cannot be avoided. The principle of necessity means that no choice of means and no moment for deliberation is left. Thus, even though Israel has made allegations about the purported actions of those individuals who were killed and has not furnished evidence, even if the allegations were accurate, there are rules under international humanitarian law that should have governed Israel’s conduct.
[1] See LAW press releases of 11 December 2000 and 12 January 2001.
[2] Dalia Shehori and Amos Harel, Territories calmer, but top IDF brass unsure it will last,
Ha’aretz, 15 January 2001
[3] The State Security Court (SSC) was established in 1995 as a special court, which functions outside the Palestinian civil and military court systems, apparently under pressure by Israel and the USA “to combat terrorism”. The SSC does not operate according to fair trial standards. In the beginning the SSC was mostly used to try Islamist activists suspected to support Hamas or Islamic Jihad, and sentences imposed in grossly unfair trials were welcomed publicly by representatives of the Israeli and US governments. See Amnesty International, Trials as Midnight: Secret, summary, unfair trials in Gaza. MDE 15/15/95.
[4] Moshe Reinfeld and Amira Hass, Human rights groups condemn summary executions,
Ha’aretz, 15 January 2001.
[5] Keith B. Richburg, Israelis confirm wider policy of assassinations, Washington Post, 7 January 2001.
[6] See Gideon Alon, Mofaz: IDF jurist approved killings, Ha’aretz, 11 January 2001.
[7] Ha’aretz Breaking News, 23 November, IDF plans response to Hadera terrorist attack.
[8] See Ha’aretz Breaking News, 23 November 2000, Israel will retaliate with elite units.
[9] Amos Harel, IDF revises strategy of attacking PA targets. Use of helicopter gunships now seen as ineffective, Ha’aretz, 4 December 2000.
[10] Akiva Eldar, Meridor slams ‘liquidation’ policy, Ha’aretz, 4 January 2001.
[11] Akiva Eldar, Liquidation sale for the peace process, Ha’aretz, 4 January 2001.
[12] Gideon Alon, Mofaz: IDF jurist approved killings, Ha’aretz, 11 January 2001.
[13] Dalia Shehori and Amos Harel, Territories calmer, but top IDF brass unsure it will last, Ha’aretz, 15 January 2001.
[14] Sneh hints liquidation policy v. “arch-terrorists” to go on, Ha’aretz Breaking News, 24 January 2001.
[15] Statement to LAW on 17 December 2000.
[16] See Amos Harel and Amira Hass, Fatah vows revenge after IDF kills activist in helicopter raid, Ha’aretz, 10 November 2000.
[17] Ibidem.
[18] See Amira Hass, Dispute over death of Hamas ‘bomber’, Ha’aretz, 24 November 2000.
[19] Alan Bana Audi was sentenced to death by the Palestinian State Security Court in Nablus on 7 December in a grossly unfair trial. He was found guilty of treason, espionage and being an accomplice in the murder of Ibrahim Bani Audi. Alan Bana Audi admitted to the charges of treason but denied those of premeditated murder. See LAW press release of 11 December 2000. Alan Bana Audi was executed by firing squad in Nablus on 13 January 2001.
[20] From LAW’s notes of trial observation. The trial was held at the State Security Court in Nablus on 7 December 2000.
[21] Amos Harel, Man killed as shooting erupts in West Bank and Gaza, Ha’aretz Breaking News, 11 December 2000. See also IDF kills Islamic Jihad activist, ibidem.
[22] Statement to LAW on 12 December 2000.
[23] Statement to LAW on 12 December 2000.
[24] See LAW press release of 8 March 2000.
[25] Statement to LAW on 10 January 2001.
[26] See Amos Harel, Four Israelis injured, IDF kill wanted Fatah gunman, Ha’aretz, 13 December 2001.
[27] Under the Oslo Accords, the Hebron Protocol, signed on 17 January 1997, established a division of Hebron in area H1, under Palestinian control, and area H2, under Israeli control.
[28] Statement to LAW on 14 December 2000.
[29] Amos Harel and Amira Hass, Five die in territories fighting, Ha’aretz, 14 December 2000.
[30] Statement to LAW on 20 January 2001.
[31] Under the Oslo Accords the Occupied Palestinian territories have been divided into areas A, B and C. In area A Palestinians have responsibility for civil affairs and internal security while Israel is responsible for external security.
[32] In Area C Israel has responsibility for civil affairs and all (internal and external) security.
[33] See Amira Hass, Top Fatah official gunned down. IDF neither admits nor denies he was targeted; Palestinians vow revenge, Ha’aretz, 1 January 2001.
[34] Ibidem.
[35] See Amos Harel, ‘Signs of Anarchy’ appearing in PA, says security source, Ha’aretz, 8 January 2001.
[36] Keith B. Richburg, Israelis confirm wider policy of assassinations, Washington Post, 7/1/ 2001.
[37] See Moshe Reinfeld, Slain Fatah leader’s wife petitions High Court on executions, Ha’aretz, 10 January 2001; PM ordered to respond to petition on killings, Haaretz, 16 January 2001.
[38] By declaring that the current Palestinian uprising is an armed conflict, Israeli is justifying wide ranging margins in the employment of lethal force than would otherwise be tolerated. The current uprising is not an armed conflict, but rather a mélange encompassing civil protest and shooting incidents. The shooting incidents are largely conducted by loose individuals or groups with little or no co-ordination or structure that would not even warrant the term militia let alone army. This doesn’t justify invoking the law of hostilities, which permits military actions against enemy forces. In other words, the actions pertaining to war.
[39]
According to Richard Falk, with reference to the first intifada, there
exists a moral and legal foundation for a positive endorsement for a
struggle of resistance. He further argues that if political theory is
generally supportive of a right to revolution
“to oppose tyranny and domestic oppression, then surely such a
right exists in relation to alien forms of oppression.” See The Legal
Defence of the Intifada, Richard A Falk and Burns H. Weston, Harvard Law
Journal winter 1991. The UN has made clear the legal rights and duties in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a series of key widely supported
resolutions, including the following:
[40] If however, in the process of attempting to detain, the suspect acts in ways that pose an immediate threat to the life of those attempting to arrest and detain, then and only then can a killing provided it was proportional to the threat, be said to be “lawful”.
The
Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment
is a non-governmental organisation dedicated to preserving human rights
through legal advocacy.LAW is affiliate to the International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ), Fédération Internationale des Ligues de Droits de l’Homme
(FIDH), World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and Member of the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network.